H&R Block v. Intuit by United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI 
 WESTERN DIVISION 
 
H&R Block Eastern Enterprises,   ) 
Inc., et al.,     )  
      ) 
 Plaintiffs,     )  
vs.       ) No. 13-0072-CV-W-FJG  
      ) 
Intuit, Inc.,      )  
      ) 




 Pending before the Court is Defendant Intuit Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Count II of 
Plaintiff’s Complaint and to Strike Portions of Count III (Doc. No. 57). 
I. Background 
 This case involves two television advertisements for TurboTax software. These 
advertisements are known as “Master Plumber” and “Return Expert.” See Complaint, Doc. 
No. 1, ¶ 26. At issue with the pending motion is plaintiffs’ claim under Section 32(1)(A) of 
the Lanham Act, for trademark infringement. In the subject advertisements, defendant 
compares federal income tax filers’ usage of TurboTax software to H&R Block’s in-store tax 
preparation services.  The claim in the advertisements is, “more Americans trusted their 
federal taxes to TurboTax last year than H&R Block stores and all other major tax stores 
combined.”  Complaint, Doc. No. 1, ¶ 33. The commercials also include a bar graph 
comparing TurboTax use versus other major tax stores, including H&R Block.  TurboTax is 
represented by a red bar, while H&R Block is represented by a green bar.   
 As is relevant to the resolution of the pending motion, plaintiffs argue that defendant 
has infringed on their trademark, in violation of federal law (Count II), and has violated 
Missouri common law as well (Count III).  Defendant moves to dismiss the trademark 
infringement claims found in Count II under Rule 12(b)(6).  Defendant also moves under 
Case 4:13-cv-00072-FJG   Document 137   Filed 05/22/13   Page 1 of 5
2 
 
Rule 12(f) to strike reference to trademark infringement allegations within plaintiffs’ Missouri 
unfair competition claim under Missouri common law in Count III. 
II. Standard 
 To survive a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,129 S.Ct. 1937,1949,173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A 
pleading that merely pleads “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation” of the 
elements of a cause of action, or “naked assertions” devoid of “further factual 
enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly). “Determining whether a complaint 
states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) the Court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and 
grant all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1010 
(8th Cir.2005). 
 Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) provides that a court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient 
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”  “A court enjoys 
liberal discretion under Rule 12(f) ... however, motions to strike are viewed with disfavor 
and rarely granted.” Openmethods, LLC v. Mediu, LLC, 10-761-CV-W-FJG, 2011 WL 
2292149 (W.D. Mo. June 8, 2011) 
III. Discussion 
 Defendant argues that (1) Count II of plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed under 
the “nominative fair use” doctrine; and (2) even if the Court found the “nominative fair use” 
doctrine did not apply, there is no likelihood of confusion arising from these comparative 
advertisements.  The Court finds it necessary to consider only the second of these two 
arguments. 
 In a trademark infringement case under 15 U.S.C. § 1114, a plaintiff has the burden 
to prove defendant’s use of the mark “is likely to produce confusion in the minds of 
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consumers about the origin of the goods or services in question.”  KP Permanent Make-Up, 
Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117 (2004).  Defendant argues that 
plaintiffs have set forth no facts suggesting that they can meet their burden to demonstrate 
consumer confusion, and the facts set forth as to plaintiff’s unfair competition claim 
undermine their trademark infringement claim.  As noted by defendant, in the Eighth Circuit, 
there are six non-exclusive factors (the “SquirtCo. factors”) that courts use in considering 
whether there is a likelihood of consumer confusion as to the origin of a product or service: 
 (1) the strength of the owner’s mark; (2) the similarity of the owner’s mark and the alleged 
infringer’s mark; (3) the degree of competition between the products; (4) the alleged 
infringer’s intent to “pass off” its goods as the trademark owner’s; (5) incidents of actual 
confusion; and (6) the type of product, its cost, and the conditions of purchase.  SquirtCo. v. 
Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1090 (8th Cir. 1980); Everest Capital Ltd. v. Everest Funds 
Mgmt., L.L.C., 393 F.3d 755, 759-60 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 Defendant indicates that it is uncontested that plaintiffs own certain rights to the 
name “H&R Block” and that defendant used the term “H&R Block” in its competitive 
commercial advertisements; defendant therefore indicates that this makes the first three of 
the six SquirtCo. factors irrelevant.  Defendant further asserts that there is no allegation by 
plaintiffs of defendant’s intent to pass off its services as H&R Block’s (and, in fact, the point 
of the commercials is to distinguish defendant’s services from H&R Block’s).  Additionally, 
plaintiffs have not alleged any incidents of actual consumer confusion regarding the source, 
origin or sponsorship of defendant’s advertisements, goods, or services.  Finally, defendant 
notes that the type of product and conditions of purchase decrease the likelihood of 
confusion, as the vast majority of plaintiffs’ federal tax return business comes from its in-
store customers whereas defendant is a “do-it-yourself software product.”  Complaint, Doc. 
No. 1, ¶ 37.  In other words, defendant argues that the complaint is implausible on its face, 
in that a purchaser could not be confused by the advertisements so as to believe TurboTax 
software is endorsed by H&R Block. 
 Plaintiffs respond that they have alleged a sufficient likelihood of confusion to 
maintain a trademark infringement claim.  Realizing that they have not pled confusion about 
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the source or origin of the service represented by the trademark, plaintiffs seem to argue 
that “confusion” under trademark infringement law should be read more broadly so as to 
include general confusion about the quality and nature of plaintiffs’ and defendant’s 
services.  In support of this proposition, plaintiffs cite to a variety of cases from outside the 
Eighth Circuit which seemingly stand for the proposition that, when 15 U.S.C. § 1114 was 
amended in 1962 to delete the phrase “purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods 
or services,” from the end of the former definition, which now reads “likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,” this broadened the Act so as to now cover 
any kind of consumer confusion, mistake, or deception.  See, e.g., Kos Pharms., Inc. v. 
Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 711 (3d Cir. 2004).1  However, as noted by defendant in its 
reply suggestions, the 1962 amendments to the Lanham Act were expanded so as to 
protect non-purchasers of a product (as opposed to just purchasers).  See Doc. No. 116, p. 
9, n.3 (citing 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:7 (4th ed.)).  None of 
the cases cited by plaintiffs, furthermore, expand trademark infringement law to include 
alleged confusion where it is clear from the context of the ads that the plaintiff is not an 
originator, sponsor, or endorser of the ad. 
 In short, the Court agrees with defendant, and finds that plaintiffs have not stated a 
claim upon which relief can be granted for trademark infringement.  Although consumer 
confusion is typically an issue of fact reserved for summary judgment (see Anheuser-Busch 
Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 773 (8th Cir. 1994)), the Court finds that upon the 
facts alleged by plaintiffs, there is no possibility that consumers could be confused as to 
whether plaintiffs endorse or sponsor defendant’s products or services.  See also Murray v. 
Cable Nat. Broad. Co., 86 F.3d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of 
trademark infringement claim).  Furthermore, plaintiffs’ broad reading of the term 
                                                 
1 Notably, in Kos, as well as all the other cases cited by plaintiffs, the underlying courts 
were examining trademark infringement actions where the defendant had named its 
product or service a similar name to that used by the plaintiff.  (In Kos, the dispute was 
regarding two similar pharmaceutical products, Altocor and Advocor.)  In other words, 
all the cases cited by plaintiff are inapposite to the current situation, which appears to be 
classic comparative advertising instead of an attempt by defendant to appropriate 
plaintiffs’ trademark. 
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“confusion” has no support under current Eighth Circuit law, which provides that the type of 
confusion contemplated under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 is confusion as to source, origin, 
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of a good or service.  See ConAgra, Inc. v. George 
A. Hormel, & Co., 990 F.2d 368, 369 (8th Cir. 1993); Sensient Technologies Corp. v. 
SensoryEffects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d 754, 769 (2010); Anheuser-Busch Inc., 28 F.3d at 
774; Davis v. Walt Disney Co., 430 F.3d 901, 905 (8th Cir. 2005); Everest Capital Limited, 
393 F.3d at 759-60.  
 The Court further finds that, to the extent plaintiffs have incorporated references to 
the allegations from Count II into Count III (their state-law claim), these allegations should 
be stricken under Rule 12(f) as immaterial. 
IV. Conclusion 
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant Intuit Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Count 
II of Plaintiff’s Complaint and to Strike Portions of Count III (Doc. No. 57) is GRANTED.  
IT IS SO ORDERED.    
 /s/ FERNANDO J. GAITAN, JR.  
        Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr. 
Chief United States District Judge 
Dated:   May 22, 2013  . 
Kansas City, Missouri. 
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